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 Gary Lawson & David Kopel’s Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental 
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate1 purports to reply to my essay defending the 
constitutionality of the health care mandate.2 Surprisingly, however, most of my claims, about 
the scope of the commerce and taxing powers, attract little of their attention.3 And even with 
respect to the Necessary and Proper Clause, which is the focus of their essay, they do not 
defend—or even mention—the principal target of my attack: the reasoning of the federal district 
courts that have agreed with them that the mandate is unconstitutional. 
 The really big surprise is their account of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Relying on a 
new book coauthored by Lawson, The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause,4 they argue 
that the Clause incorporates norms from eighteenth-century agency law, administrative law, and 
corporate law, and that the mandate (and perhaps much else in the U.S. Code, though they are 
coy about this5) violates those norms. The book is a valuable contribution, an original and 
enlightening exploration of the contemporaneous meaning of the clause. The book is, however, 
careful to take no position on how the Clause should be interpreted today.6 Bad News for 
Professor Koppelman is bolder. It is, to my knowledge, the first modern piece that has ever 
                         
1 Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental 
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267 (2011), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/11/08/lawson&kopel.html. 
2 Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health 
Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/ 
2011/04/26/koppelman.html. 
3 They do challenge those claims briefly in explaining that “lack of space” prevents a fuller 
rebuttal. Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 268 n.8. 
4 GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS 
OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (2010) [hereinafter ORIGINS]. 
5 See infra notes 23 - 25, 48-49 and accompanying text. 
6 See Gary Lawson, Geoffrey P. Miller, Robert G. Natelson & Guy I. Seidman, Raiders of the 
Lost Clause: Excavating the Buried Foundations of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in 
ORIGINS, supra note 4, at 1, 8-9.  
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proposed that these eighteenth-century norms become the master concepts for determining the 
scope of congressional power today.7 
 Because what they offer is new news, it seems harsh to reproach me for not taking the 
limits they offer into account in my own consideration of congressional power. How could I have 
known? Nor am I alone in my innocence. For nearly 200 years, the federal government has taken 
on ever larger responsibilities without reference to these limits, which had been forgotten. From 
now on, Lawson and Kopel tell us, everything will have to be different. Any question of 
congressional power must ignore all of this history, and be resolved solely with reference to 
“careful study of the Clause’s origin, purpose, and meaning.”8 
 The Necessary and Proper Clause, as they understand it, tightly limits the scope of 
implied powers. Their logic implies the greatest revolution in federal power in American history. 
(And as I shall shortly explain, this would decidedly be a revolution from above.) The stakes go 
way, way beyond health care reform. Lawson and Kopel do not merely want to burn the house to 
roast the pig. They are ready to torch the whole city. 
 
I. The New (Original) Necessary and Proper Clause 
 
 Lawson and Kopel raise two constitutional objections to the mandate. First, “a law 
enacted under the clause must exercise a subsidiary rather than an independent power.”9 The 
mandate does not satisfy this requirement, because “the power to order someone to purchase a 
product is not a power subordinate or inferior to other powers.”10 Second, an exercise of power 
must treat citizens impartially, “with an eye towards the interests of all affected persons.”11 This 
requirement is violated by a mandate that requires people to buy insurance “in order to subsidize 
other people.”12 These are, they acknowledge, unfamiliar rules of law, “perhaps strange-
sounding to modern ears.13 I will consider each in turn. 
 
A. Worthy and Dignified 
 
 The first of the requirements is puzzling. An incident must be “a thing necessarily 
depending upon, appertaining to, or following another thing that is more worthy or principal.”14 
How are we to tell if one power is as “worthy” or “dignified” as another? To return to a case I 
                         
7 The proposal is suggested, with little elaboration, in a few passages in Robert G. Natelson, The 
Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 
243 (2004). 
8 Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 268-70. 
9 Id. at 270. 
10 Id. at 271. 
11 Id. at 288. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 270. 




focused on in my first essay,15 how are we to know that the power to jail those who rob the mails 
is “less important or less valuable”16 than the enumerated power to operate a post office?17 
 These terms may have made sense in the eighteenth century. “By the founding era, the 
jurisprudence of principals and incidents had become a prominent and well-developed branch of 
the law. Numerous cases had specified which lesser interests were incident to which greater 
interests.”18 But it is not obvious how to translate these terms from their then-familiar 
applications in property law or the law of corporations to the very different context of 
governmental powers. Marshall tried to do it in McCulloch v. Maryland.19 So did others at the 
time who struggled with the question presented there: whether Congress had the power to charter 
a bank.20 Lawson and Kopel are right that I paid no attention to these discussions. The reason 
was that these terms are no part of modern constitutional doctrine: as they concede, “[m]ore 
recent cases no longer use the language of principals and incidents.”21 Since the lower courts to 
which I was responding have claimed that the mandate was unconstitutional under existing law, I 
thought that my task was to justify the mandate under that law. 
These terms take us into terra incognita. The debates at the time of McCulloch show that 
even then, there was deep uncertainty about how to apply the doctrine of principals and incidents 
to Article I of the Constitution.22 It is even harder to know how to apply them today. And what 
would be the consequence if we did?  
All we are told is that the holdings of more recent cases—meaning, cases decided in the 
last century—“are broadly consistent with that framework,”23 and that sustaining the 
constitutional objection to the individual mandate “does not require overruling any decision.”24 
They add that “one could fairly argue that those decisions misapplied the original meaning of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, but those arguments would involve issues not raised here.”25 It is, 
in short, an open question how much of existing law would have to be scrapped if this worth-
and-dignity rule were adopted by the courts. 
                         
15 Koppelman, supra note 2, at 5, 8, 9. 
16 Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in ORIGINS, supra 
note 4, at 52, 61. 
17 Lawson and Kopel respond to this difficulty by arguing that, under a 1711 English statute, “the 
power to ‘establish’ a post office seems directly to have included the power to define and punish 
crimes against the post office.”  Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 278 n.42. But the only 
evidence they offer for this proposition is the title of the English statute, “An Act for 
Establishing a General Post Office,” the substance of which extends to defining crimes against 
the post office. It will take more than one statute’s casual use of a label to establish that the 
shared semantic meaning of “post office,” evident to any reasonable person in the eighteenth 
century, included the apparatus of criminal justice. 
18 Natelson, supra note 16, at 62. 
19 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-21 (1819). 
20 See Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in 
ORIGINS, supra note 4, at 84, 114-19. 
21 Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 283. 
22 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
23 Id. They do, however, express doubt that the federal government has any power to regulate the 
insurance industry. Id. at 271 n.14.  
24 Id. at 284 n.66. 
25 Id. at 283. 
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 What is not uncertain is that the federal government now exercises unenumerated powers 
that are not obviously lesser to the enumerated ones. The enumerated power “to establish a 
uniform Rule of Naturalization”26 seems no more “dignified”27 than Congress’s plenary 
authority to regulate immigration and exclude aliens.28 Perhaps what they say about the mandate 
is also true of control over the borders: this “is an extraordinary power of independent 
significance . . . that would be enumerated as a principal power if it were granted at all to the 
federal government.”29 Congress regulates air and water pollution under the Clean Air Act30 and 
the Clean Water Act,31 which is “not a ‘less worthy’ or less substantial power than the power to 
regulate commerce.”32 Nor is the power to regulate intrastate railway rates that have “a close and 
substantial relation to interstate traffic, to the efficiency of interstate service, and to the 
maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair 
terms.”33 Nor is the power to ban racial discrimination in places of public accommodation that 
serve interstate travelers or that sell products shipped across state lines34: the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 may be in trouble.35 Nor is the power to regulate the sale of adulterated food: the Pure Food 
and Drug Act may also have to go.36 Nor is the sale of securities, which typically is not 
conducted across state lines: so much for the Securities and Exchange Commission.37 Nor is 
banking: out goes the Federal Reserve.38 Congress has the enumerated power to “coin Money,”39 
but the power to print paper money is not obviously inferior or subordinate to this, and Madison 
denounced any such power at the end of Federalist 10.40 
 
B. Fiduciary Duties 
 
 Exercises of power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, they argue, must conform to 
the fiduciary obligation “to treat all principals with presumptive equality when there is more than 
one principal.”41 The mandate violates this: “The purpose of the individual mandate is to force 
                         
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
27 Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 279. 
28 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 
130 U.S. 581 (1889); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (1888); Chew Heong v. 
United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884). 
29 Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 280. 
30 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006). 
31 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). 
32 Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 280. 
33 Houston E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914). 
34 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
35 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
36 Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768. 
37 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006). 
38 Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3 (2006). 
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
40 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at X (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). As has Lawson. 
Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 
33 (1994). 
41 Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 288. 
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people who choose not to buy a particular type of insurance from government-favored 
oligopolists to buy the unwanted product in order to subsidize other people.”42 
 Note the peculiar formulation in the cumbersomely constructed sentence just quoted, 
which uses the preposition “to” twice to refer to two different infinitive verbs,43 thus stating the 
Act’s purpose ambiguously. Which of these do they take to be the purpose: to force people to 
buy, or to subsidize health care consumers who would lose out in an unregulated market? It is a 
silly question, of course. The answer is, both. However, it is clear (and the sentence implicitly 
acknowledges) which is the end and which is the means. The reason for the mandate, its 
instrumental purpose, is to spread the cost of insuring those with preexisting conditions who 
would be unable to buy insurance absent the regulatory scheme.44 If the latter is the fundamental 
purpose of the law, then it is hardly clear that Congress has not acted “with an eye towards the 
interests of all affected persons.”45 Congress is trying to make sure that everyone equally has 
access to adequate and affordable health care. Lawson and Kopel have not explained why that is 
not “to treat them all fairly.”46 Indeed, it is arguable that Congress violated its fiduciary 
obligations by allowing the health care issue to fester, and millions to go uninsured, for decades 
before it finally addressed it. 
 Maybe Lawson and Kopel understand the impartiality requirement more radically than 
this, to require not just that government act for impartial reasons, but that any laws that it enacts 
does not benefit or harm any distinct class of citizens. There may not be “political favorites.”47 
But all laws classify and create winners and losers. If that is what is forbidden, then all laws 
would be, at least presumptively, unconstitutional.48 How that presumption of anarchy could be 
rebutted, and what the new “general federal ‘equal protection’ doctrine that extends far beyond 
the specific case of the individual mandate”49 would entail, is something that Lawson is not yet 
ready to tell us. Until he does, the claim that the mandate violates this rule is too cryptic to 
answer. 
 
II. A Larger Agenda 
 
I said at the outset that their “reply” may not really be a reply.  They implicitly concede 
my central claim, that the mandate is plainly legitimate under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
as it has been understood in the United States for more than half a century. The judicial opinions 
declaring the mandate unconstitutional were transparently dishonest in claiming that their 
approach was required by (or even consistent with) settled precedent concerning the scope of 
                         
42 Id. 
43 Actually it contains four infinitive verbs, but “to force” and “to subsidize” are the two 
plausible candidates for the statute’s purpose. 
44 The mandate is an eminently rational means to that end. See Koppelman, supra note 2, at 2, 
14-18. 
45 Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 288. 
46 Natelson, supra note 16, at 59. 
47 Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 291. 
48 The anarchical tendencies of Lawson’s suspicion of law are noted in Larry Alexander, Proving 
the Law: Not Proven, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 905 (1992). 
49 Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 291 n.94. 
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congressional power.50 Lawson and Kopel properly treat those arguments as beneath their notice.  
Conformity with precedent is no part of their project. 
 The rules that Lawson and Kopel’s originalist research claims to have uncovered,51 if 
implemented, would seem to accomplish just what I have said that other arguments against the 
mandate would do: “randomly blow up large parts of the U.S. Code.”52 But this cannot be said of 
Lawson and Kopel. It rather appears that they would deliberately blow up large parts of the U.S. 
Code.   
Why would one think that the destruction of so much existing American law is 
appropriate? It would obviously be silly to claim that settled law is untouchable, but is it not 
equally obvious that it should not be trashed whenever new archival research casts doubt on its 
originalist credentials? 
Of the two authors, Lawson is the one with the most thoroughly worked out interpretive 
theory, so I will focus on his other work for an answer.53 The most prominent scholars who 
claim that the mandate is unconstitutional are all hunting for bigger game; all have long sought a 
revolution in federal power.54 Lawson, one of our most sophisticated constitutional theorists, is 
no exception. But even within this crowd, his well-matured constitutional theory incorporates an 
unusual degree of recklessness. 
Lawson is untroubled by the wholesale overruling of precedent, because he does not 
think that precedent is part of the Constitution and thinks that it is indeed unconstitutional to give 
it any weight at all.55 He is also confident that “the post-New Deal administrative state is 
unconstitutional.”56 The elimination of all federal regulation of the complex American economy 
might, of course, devastate the lives of millions of people, turning American life into a nightmare 
of pollution, consumer fraud, contaminated food and drink, and rampant racial discrimination. A 
judicial decision that U.S. paper money is worthless would throw the whole world economy into 
depression, possibly precipitating famines and wars. Other opponents of the health care law, such 
as Randy Barnett and Richard Epstein,57 who want to dismantle the modern administrative state, 
                         
50 See Koppelman, supra note 2, at 7-9. 
51 Not being a historian, I cannot judge the accuracy of those claims, but I have no reason to 
doubt them. The authors of The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause are all respected 
and careful scholars. 
52 Koppelman, supra note 2, at 11. 
53 Kopel may not agree with Lawson’s larger project, so the critique in Part II is addressed 
exclusively to Lawson. Lawson and Kopel’s argument stands on its own, and the argument of 
Part I supra recognizing its radical implications does not, in any way, rely on Lawson’s prior 
work. That said, my claim is reinforced by evidence that those implications are intended.  When 
you, the reader, evaluate their interpretation of the Constitution, I think it is relevant (this is one 
of my methodological differences with Lawson, see infra notes 59 - 62 and accompanying text) 
that the judicial adoption of that interpretation would harm you and your family. 
54 Koppelman, supra note 2, at 18-23. 
55 Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA 
L. REV. 1 (2007); Lawson, supra note 40.  
56 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 
(1994). 
57 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
(2004); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT 
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are naively optimistic about the results that will follow from its demolition. Lawson just does not 
care. He is prepared “to hold fast to the Constitution though the heavens may fall.”58 In 
interpreting the Constitution, he has warned, we must not “contaminate the interpretative inquiry 
with concerns about real-world decisionmaking.”59 
Lawson thinks that constitutional interpretation must never be contaminated by such 
nontextual considerations—that, in fact, any mode of reasoning that does take consequences into 
account is not entitled to be called interpretation.60 Rather, it is “self-evident”61 that interpreters 
must read constitutional texts in isolation from their effects. It makes no difference whether we 
are reading the Confederate constitution or the one that governs the United States today.62 
It would be silly to wrestle with him63 over who gets to use the term “interpretation,” but 
I will note that the public meaning of the term in contemporary America refers to the practice of 
parsing the Constitution as it is in fact done by the federal courts. American constitutional 
interpretation—like it or not, that is the label that the natives around here attach to the practice—
does not rely exclusively on original intention or meaning. Philip Bobbitt has shown that 
American constitutional argument also draws upon on precedent, inferences from the overall 
structure of the government that has been established, prudence, and the court’s sense of the 
national ethos. Constitutional arguments aim to draw all of these together into coherent accounts 
of constitutional meaning.64 Because we must live with the results, our deepest collective 
                                                                               
TO HEALTH CARE? (1997); Randy E. Barnett, The Case for a Federalism Amendment, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 23, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124044199838345461.html; Richard A. 
Epstein, Impermissible Ratemaking in Health-Insurance Reform: Why the Reid Bill Is 
Unconstitutional, POINT OF LAW (Dec. 18, 2009), 
http://www.pointoflaw.com/columns/archives/2009/12/impermissible-ratemaking-in-he.php. 
58 Lawson, supra note 56, at 1249. His views on this question are somewhat unclear, however. 
Elsewhere he suggests that it may be impossible to show that the Constitution has authority in 
the contemporary United States. Gary Lawson, Interpretative Equality as a Structural Imperative 
(or “Pucker Up and Settle This!”), 20 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 381 (2003) [hereinafter Lawson, 
Interpretive Equality]; Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 
1823, 1835-36 (1997) [hereinafter Lawson, On Reading Recipes]. Evidently he doubts the 
Constitution’s authority but is prepared to invoke it whenever it would help defeat any assertion 
of state power. 
59 GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION 
AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 9 (2004). 
60 See generally Lawson, Reading Recipes, supra note 58. 
61 LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 59, at 9. 
62 Id. 
63 He is ready to wrestle. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism As a Legal 
Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 78 n.79 (2006). 
64 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982). Bobbitt 
denies that there is any algorithm for constitutional interpretation but defends the consequent 
indeterminacy on the basis that it “gives us a way to measure a possible legal world against our 
sense of rightness, going back and forth between a proposed interpretation and its world, and 
ourselves.” PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 158 (1991). Robert Tsai has 
shown that constitutional law is even more indeterminate than Bobbitt allows, inasmuch as it has 
been significantly shaped by rhetorical moves that do not fit into any of Bobbitt’s modalities. See 
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aspirations also inevitably influence the interpretive inquiry.65 We don’t read the Constitution we 
have to live with the way we read the Confederate one.   
The real originalist question is one of original purpose at different levels of abstraction. 
The commerce power has been stretched beyond anything specifically intended by the framers. 
But the framers also had a more abstract intention: in Robert Stern’s words, “that no hiatus 
between the powers of the state and federal governments to control commerce was intended to 
exist,”66 and that the people of the United States should not “be entirely unable to help 
themselves through any existing social or governmental agency.”67 It is like the old question 
whether the general purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment—to mandate the legal equality of 
blacks—should trump the framers’ specific intention to permit school segregation and 
miscegenation laws.68 The general purpose of the Constitution, the overriding reason why the 
Articles of Confederation were abandoned, a reason known by every reasonable interpreter of the 
document at the time, was that the country was facing pressing national problems that no one 
state could solve.69 That is why it is a legitimate move in constitutional argumentation to dismiss 
an argument for constraints on congressional power, even constraints that some framers may 
specifically have had in mind, as “so pernicious in its operation that we shall be compelled to 
discard it.”70 Lawson and Kopel’s originalism is not the only possible originalism.71 What is 
fundamentally perverse about their reading of the Clause is that it reproduces the situation that 
the Constitution was an attempt to overcome.72 
                                                                               
ROBERT TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT CULTURE 31-32 
(2008). 
65 JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 
(2011). 
66 Robert L. Stern, The Commerce That Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 
1335, 1365 (1943).  
67 Id. at 1335. 
68 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 117–33, 161–63 (1977); Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth 
Amendment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224 (1966).  
69 In the terms that one of Lawson’s coauthors proposes, one might reasonably think that the 
power to solve problems that the states are separately incompetent to address is an “incidental 
power to undertake acts not within a strict construction but within the scope presumptively 
intended by the parties.” Natelson, supra note 16, at 67. 
70 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416 (1819). 
71 Originalism is now a large cluster of very different theories. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. 
Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 239 (2008). Jack Rakove’s warning is pertinent here: 
With its pressing ambition to find determinate meanings at a fixed moment, the 
strict theory of orginalism cannot capture everything that was dynamic and 
creative, and thus uncertain and problematic, in the constitutional experiments of 
the Revolutionary era . . . . Where we look for precise answers, the framers and 
ratifiers were still struggling with complex and novel questions whose perplexities 
did not disappear in 1788. 
JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
10 (1996). 
72 Robert Bennett has noted Lawson’s tendency to implicitly ascribe nonobvious traits to his 




III. “Originalism” as a Rationalization for Oligarchy 
 
There is also a question of democratic legitimacy. The mandate was enacted by Congress 
after a big, public political fight. Lawson and Kopel propose to override this and to have the 
federal courts strike it down, in the name of a highly contestable conception of the Constitution. 
Lawson, a former Reagan Administration official, is frustrated that Presidents Ronald 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush never even opposed legislation on the grounds that it exceeded 
Congress’s enumerated powers and certainly never tried to dismantle the modern regulatory 
state.73 They did not do it because they knew it would be politically disastrous. Voters do not 
like poisoned food, air, and water. 
The solution, then, is to do it through the courts: to impose—in the name of an admittedly 
fictitious, We the People of the United States74—results that most of the actual population of the 
United States would hate. To Lawson, it does not matter what the people think. A small elite of 
enlightened ones, drawing on specialized knowledge, will bring us a higher form of democracy 
that reflects the people’s deepest interests, and they will do it by seizing centralized power. 
But of course, we need to put originalist scholarship in context.75 Lawson may be ready 
to dismantle the entire modern administrative state, but—as he often cheerfully admits76—that is 
not going to happen. His work is, however, likely to be right handy for political actors inclined to 
be more selective. A revealing text here is a footnote from Justice Clarence Thomas’s 
concurrence in United States v. Lopez,77 which advocated a restriction of federal power much 
like Lawson and Kopel advocate, but with this proviso: 
 
Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize 
that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental 
reexamination of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare decisis and reliance 
interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean.78  
 
Thomas’s deference to precedent is only partial, however. He is still prepared to use originalism 
to trash those aspects of existing practice that he is satisfied that the country can do without.79 
                                                                               
the Living Constitution, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 107 (2011). The inclination to privilege specific over general purposes 
is one of those nonobvious traits. 
73 Lawson, supra note 56, at 1237. 
74 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 63, at 59-61. 
75 For another, related attempt to do this, see Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the 
Establishment Clause, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727, 749-50 (2009). 
76 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 56, at 1236; Lawson, supra note 40, at 33. 
77 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
78 Id. at 601 n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) (admitting to being a selectively “faint-hearted originalist”). 
79 Thus, for example, he recently declared “my view that the Establishment Clause restrains only 
the Federal government, and that, even if incorporated, the Clause only prohibits ‘actual legal 
coercion.’”  Utah Highway Patrol Assn. v. American Atheists, 565 U.S. __, __ (2011)(Thomas, 
J., dissenting from denial of cert.), quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  This would destroy at a stroke a large doctrinal structure of 
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There is a sense in which Thomas is more moderate than Lawson: a proposal to shoot everyone 
is more extreme than a proposal to shoot only those whom some central decisionmaker decides 
to liquidate. On the other hand, Thomas’s modification of Lawsonian originalism transforms it 
from an exotic and weird philosophy of governance into one that is depressingly familiar: a little 
group of oligarchs get to govern everyone else.80 Lawson seems a charming, mostly harmless81 
crank because his proposals are so unreal. In the hands of Thomas, however, originalism loses its 
harmlessness and thus its charm. 
 
Conclusion: Bad News for Everybody 
 
If we read the Constitution as Lawson and Kopel propose, then historical research of the 
kind that they have been doing becomes a lever that can move the world. New evidence of the 
original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause shows that American law misconstrues that 
meaning. So much the worse for American law. The rest of us, if we believe in the rule of law, 
are obligated to upend our lives and adapt to the new marching orders that emerge from the 
archives, at least until the next round of research yanks us off in another direction.82 This would 
be an insane way to run a civilization. It is bad news for everybody. 
 
 
Andrew Koppelman is John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political 
Science at Northwestern University and a former Senior Editor of The Yale Law Journal. He 
gives thanks to Bob Bennett, Arpit Garg, David Kopel, Gary Lawson, Simon Lazarus, Steve 
                                                                               
Constitutional restraints on state imposition of religion, such as the prohibition of official prayer 
in schools. 
80 See JEFFREY WINTERS, OLIGARCHY (2011). 
81 He is not altogether harmless, because his scholarship has influenced Supreme Court 
decisionmaking. See, for example, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997), citing Gary 
Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional 
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267 (1993), to impose limits on the 
Necessary and Proper Clause; and United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1972 n.2 
(2010)(Thomas, J., dissenting), relying on the same article to attempt to impose still further 
limits. 
82 The mercurial tendency of this kind of originalism is inadvertently displayed in Lawson’s own 
work. His earlier research produced an entirely different account of the clause, even more severe 
than the present one, under which McCulloch v. Maryland “presents a hard case.” Lawson & 
Granger, supra note 81, at 331. Yet, for some reason, the authors of The Origins of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause think that the two works are complementary. See Gary Lawson & Guy I. 
Seidman, Necessity, Propriety and Reasonableness, in ORIGINS, supra note 4, at 120, 124; 
Natelson, supra note 20, 89-90; Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, in ORIGINS, supra note 4, at 144, 155, 175. 
 The well-established, broad reading of Congressional power under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause (under which the mandate is obviously authorized, see Koppelman, supra note 2) 
is clearly a persistent irritant for Lawson. It is the fly in his ointment, the frog in his throat, the 
weed in his garden, the leak in his boat, the bats in his belfry, the pebble in his shoe, the bull in 
his china shop, the mouse in his stew. See Cole Porter, You Irritate Me So, in THE COMPLETE 
LYRICS OF COLE PORTER 304 (Robert Kimball ed. 1992). 
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